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For more than a decade the People’s Republic of China has been perceived 
as a competitor governance model to Western democracy. Since the new 
leadership under Xi Jinping started to internationally position China as the 
“world’s largest democracy,” it has been challenging the West’s prerogative 
of interpretation of political order. 
 • 	As	its	international	significance	has	grown,	China’s	demands	for	an	equal	posi-
tion in the global competition over values and discourse have increased. In pur-
suing interpretation aspirations with regard to sociocultural values and political 
order, China has started to challenge the perceived discourse hegemony of the 
United States and the West.
 •  China’s claim to be the “world’s largest democracy” is linked to its belief that the 
Chinese political system should not simply be another democratic system, tailored 
to its national conditions; rather, in comparison to India, which in the West is con-
sidered the biggest democracy, China should be the “truest” and most economi-
cally successful democracy thanks to numerous participation mechanisms.
 • The new interpretation of China’s political system is linked to long-standing 
debates amongst Chinese elites about the socialist party-state’s characteristics, 
achievements	and	deficits,	and	summarises	them	confidently	and	pointedly.	At	
the same time, China’s self-description as a "democracy" corresponds well with 
the self-image of many Chinese people.
 • China’s pursuit of international prerogative of interpretation is in line with do-
mestic goals. The assertion of discourse power strengthens the supporters of a 
"democracy with Chinese characteristics,” on the one hand, and presents an im-
plicit threat to critics of the domestic political system, on the other.
Policy Implications
Many Western observers are likely to dismiss China’s official attempts to position 
itself as the “world’s largest democracy” as nonsensical and implausible. How­
ever, an examination of the underlying demands for discourse power would ap­
pear necessary, not only from the perspective of a pluralistic approach – which 
as such takes alternative worldviews seriously. The “factual power of the norma­
tive” must also be taken into account if such alternative governance discourses 
and values are to be introduced internationally as power resources. 
Prof. Dr. Heike Holbig
Senior Research Fellow 






GIGA German Institute of Global 
and Area Studies
Leibniz-Institut für Globale  
und Regionale Studien
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21  
20354 Hamburg
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
Focus | ASIA             
   2    GIGA FoCUS | ASIA | No. 2 | JUNe 2016 
From Autocratic to “Democratic” Competitor Model?
It	 is	almost	 10	years	 since	German	politicians	 identified	 the	People’s	Republic	of	
China as a competitor governance model to Western democracy. In the fall of 2007, 
the CDU/CSU parliamentary group framed its new Asian strategy as follows: “In 
China we see an undemocratic non-liberal state rising up the global economic and 
political hierarchy. Moreover, it is developing into a model of economic governance 
for other states, which puts it in competition with the West” (Von Klaeden 2007). 
Back then, combining a “modern authoritarian” political system with an “(early) 
capitalist” economic system was deemed one of the biggest strategic challenges for 
Germany and europe. As recently as March 2016, Francis Fukuyama – author of the 
1989 essay “The end of History” – echoed a similar stance, stating that “China is a 
real test case. It is the only alternative to a liberal, capitalist democracy. The country 
is technically and economically advanced – but it pursues modernization without 
democracy” (Die Zeit 2016). In comparison with the CDU/CSU’s 2007 Asian  strategy, 
Fukuyama’s paints a negative picture of Western, liberal democracy. According to 
Fukuyama, not only have Western elites failed in the last two decades, they are not 
up to engendering pride, solidarity, or identity (Ibid.).
As these two assessments show, China’s claim of autocratic success and of being 
a competitor governance model to Western democracy is nothing new. However, 
what has changed in the West over the last decade is the growing malaise regarding 
the state of Western democracy. With this shift in the self-perception of Western 
states, there is a corresponding shift in the self-perception of China – with a surpri-
sing twist for Western observers: after some initial hesitation, China’s political and 
intellectual elites have gotten used to the attributions of an economically successful 
competitor model to the West, though not under the auspices of an “undemocratic,” 
“authoritarian,” “illiberal” system. After a decade of experimenting with various 
concepts and institutional variants of “democracy,” the Chinese state media have 
recently set about actively and explicitly positioning China as a “democracy.”
As this paper argues, this offensive points to a growing endeavour on the part 
of	the	Chinese	leadership	to	secure	an	equal	position	in	the	global	competition	over	
 values and discourse. Since Xi Jinping became head of the Chinese Communist 
 Party (CCP) and state president, the Chinese leadership has above all pursued a 
firm	soft-power	strategy	and	has	challenged	the	West’s	prerogative	of		interpretation	
of sociocultural values and political order. From the perspective of Western demo-
cracies, China’s aspirations to join the ranks of the “democratic” community may 
seem absurd. However, it is evident that China’s self-description as a “democracy” 
not only corresponds to the self-image amongst Chinese citizens, it is also part of its 
pursuit of the international  prerogative of interpretation and other domestic goals. 
In the following sections both dimensions (foreign and domestic) of China’s at-
tempt to become a “democracy” will be discussed and possible repercussions for the 
global competition over values and political order will be assessed.
China’s International Positioning as a “True” Democracy
The term minzhu (“democracy”), which was adapted to the Chinese language from 
Japanese in around 1900, is not considered an alien concept in party theoretical, 
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academic, or public discussions in China. In fact, “democracy” has an altogether 
positive connotation in Mao Zedong’s historical treatises on “new democracy” 
amongst social elites who fought for national emancipation alongside the CCP in the 
civil war; in the Leninist principle of “democratic centralism,” which determined 
the establishment of the National People’s Congress as the embodiment of popular 
sovereignty under the leadership of the CCP; and in the numerous reform-period 
experiments that have been initiated, such as village elections, competitive intra-
party elections, and deliberative and consultative democracy. In China  “democracy” 
is only clearly distinguished from liberal-democratic multiparty systems based on 
contentious	 elections,	 which	 in	 official	 documents	 are	 considered	 	irreconcilable	
with “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics” to this day. Against this 
background, it is unsurprising that “democracy” – as well as terms like “prosperity,” 
“harmony,” “freedom,” “justice,” and “rule of law” – has been nationally propagated 
since 2013 as 1 of 12 “socialist core values.”
Since Xi Jinping was selected as the new “strong man” following a decade of 
perceived reform standstill under Hu Jintao (2002–2012), one new development 
that has certainly been observed is the active positioning of China as a high-grade, 
successful democratic system – with comparisons being drawn with other democra-
cies, especially Western ones. During the run-up to the 18th Party Congress, Chi-
nese television disseminated a short video titled “How Leaders Are Made.” The clip 
compares the way in which the US and Chinese presidents execute their respective 
offices	and	how	leaders	rise	to	power.	It	caricatures	the	US	process	as	consisting	of	
drawn-out and costly election campaigns, political compromises, and the overri-
ding	importance	of	the	final	act	of	voting.	In	contrast,	the	Chinese	process	is	depic-
ted as selecting leaders on the basis of merit and skills that new leadership candi-
dates earn over the course of long political careers in which they would have faced 
various acid tests. The clip concludes that “Many roads lead to national leadership, 
and every country has one for itself. Whether by a single ballot that gets the whole 
nation	 out	 to	 vote	 or	 by	meritocratic	 screening	 that	 requires	 years	 of	 hard	work	
like	the	making	of	a	kung	fu	master,	as	long	as	people	are	satisfied	and	the	country	
develops and progresses as a result, it’s working” (“How Leaders Are Made” 2012). 
Although the term “democracy” is not used in the clip, it invokes central elements 
thereof, such as public interest and popular consent, and symbolically substitutes 
the electorate with the 85 million members of the CCP.
Another example of China’s assertion of discourse power is a June 2014 column 
titled “Beware of the Trap of Western-Style Democracy,” which appeared in the 
People’s Daily. According to the columnist, the 2013–14 protests in Ukraine and 
Thailand	–	and,	though	not	explicitly	identified,	the	“Occupy”	movement	in	Hong	
Kong in 2014 – reveal the dangers of democratic “street politics.” He also criticises 
what he sees as the trend towards full Westernisation and the blind copying of Wes-
tern	norms.	He	contends	that	China	has	recognised	that	the	unquestioned	accep-
tance of “universal values,” which actually appear to be Western values, is wrong 
and would lead to disaster (Mi 2014).
In August 2015 the party-controlled Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao) ran the 
following headline: “Which Is Ultimately the Largest Democratic Nation?” (Han 
2015). The author of the article was Han Zhen – former president and now party 
secretary of the Beijing Foreign Studies University, and head of the university’s 
Coordination and Innovation Centre for the Dissemination of Chinese Culture. In 
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the article Han criticises the West, above all the United States, for attempting to ex-
clude China from the global values discourse for being “undemocratic.” In contrast, 
India – which in the eyes of the West is the “world’s largest democracy” – enjoys a 
normatively	biased	level	of	trust,	which	he	contends	cannot	be	justified.	Han	argues	
that against this background, it is time for China to break free from the “discourse 
trap” and secure the prerogative of interpretation of global values as well as of the 
essence of democracy. For Han, it is necessary to clarify that “democracy” is a his-
torically formed term that has developed differently in various epochs and regions 
and	 for	which	 there	 are	 no	 fixed	 standards.	He	 argues	 that	 the	 Arab	 Spring	 has	
shown that the Western democratic model is not compatible with other cultural 
contexts. The lesson to be learned is that without stability and order, neither pro-
sperity for the people nor civilisational progress will be achieved. Han claims that 
the Chinese political system is not seeking to simply join the ranks of the world’s 
other democratic systems, but rather to represent, in comparison with the others, 
a “true” and “effective” democracy. He points out that unlike in many façade de-
mocracies, China ensures that the different ethnic groups and social strata in the 
political	process	and	in	the	recruitment	of	competent	leaders	are	adequately	repre-
sented. Moreover, unlike in “certain states” the Chinese people do not only have 
the choice between different “political dynasties” and their capitalist backers on 
election day, instead they are involved every day in a number of important decision-
making processes through a range of consultative mechanisms. According to Han, 
particularly in grassroots-level democratic consultations, socialism with Chinese 
characteristics has been proven to represent the true interests of the people, and 
the country’s economic success proves the vitality of the democratic system; thus 
China	can	justifiably	be	considered	the	“largest	democratic	nation.”	For	Han,	it	is	
now time for China to make this clear and no longer silently accept its (inaccurate) 
undemocratic image (Ibid.).
Geopolitical Interests and Criticism of Western  
“Discourse Hegemony”
The repeated attempts of the party-state media to position China amongst the 
world’s	democracies	raise	questions	about	the	foreign	policy	motives	behind	these	
efforts. As indicated in the article by Han Zhen, the growing competition with India 
could well play a role. After all, these two emerging Asian countries are  increasingly 
competing for regional power status. At the level of the global values debate,  China 
faces growing efforts by the Indian leadership to exclude China from certain initia-
tives and forums for being “undemocratic.” Since 2003 India has also been looking 
to secure its own free trade agreement with Brazil and South Africa within the IBSA 
Initiative	accompanied	by	various	working	bodies	 in	 the	fields	of	agriculture,	de-
fence, and public administration. Although all three countries belong to the BRICS 
group and the BICS format (without Russia), within the IBSA framework India is 
calling for a common “democratic” basic understanding, which therefore a  priori 
excludes China (Stuenkel 2015). Such competition between the two also exists 
within Asia – for instance, Myanmar’s more recent democratisation efforts have 
seen	China’s	political	influence	curtailed	in	favour	of	India’s.
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Above all, the Chinese leadership has become increasingly concerned by the 
intensification	of	the	US–Indian	alliance.	Since	Bill	Clinton	visited	India	in	2000	–	
the	first	 president	 to	 do	 so	 for	 22	 years	–	 the	 two	 countries	 have	 rapidly	moved	
closer together on the basis of shared economic and geopolitical interests. Further-
more, India and the United States held four strategic rounds of dialogue between 
2010 and 2013. Thus from China’s viewpoint, this bilateral relationship has gone to 
another level (Huang 2014). A similar convergence can also be noted between India 
and Japan, with whom China also has an increasingly tense relationship. Against 
this background, and with regard to geopolitical interests, the Chinese leadership 
may	have	sufficient	motive	to	take	measures	against	alliances	between	Western	and	
Asian democracies and even against the scenario of a “concert of democracies” from 
which China and Russia would be excluded, as has been repeatedly articulated by 
US observers since 2004.
Furthermore, Chinese criticisms of the West’s “discourse hegemony” with re-
gard to global values and governance norms should be taken seriously. In the wake 
of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 from	which	 China	 emerged	 relatively	 unscathed	 in	
comparison with the United States and europe, such critical voices have become 
increasingly vocal. Rather than passively accepting the hitherto perceived Western 
dominance in internal debates on human rights, the rule of law, freedom of the 
press, and democracy, since 2010 Chinese political and intellectual elites have been 
increasingly	 calling	 for	 equal	 standing	 in	 the	 global	 competition	over	 values	 and	
discourse power. A CCP resolution from the fall of 2011 called for the strength ening 
of the country’s cultural soft power, while “Document No. 9” from early 2013 (ori-
ginally, an internal party document) explicitly distanced the CCP from the idea of 
“universal values,” which it deems as nothing more than dominant Western  values, 
which are instrumentalised by “hostile forces” to weaken China internationally. 
With its recent attempt to become the “largest” democracy in the world, China’s 
party-state elites are simultaneously asserting China’s aspirations: to go from rule­
taker to rule­maker.
Reorientation of the Internal Debate on Chinese Democracy
The new interpretation of the Chinese political system ties in with debates about 
the characteristics, achievements, and problems of the socialist party regime that 
have been carried out for years amongst domestic elites. Following the end of so-
cialism in eastern europe, China could not withdraw from the global political dis-
course about the advantages of democracy despite the government’s crackdown on 
the democracy movement in June 1989. Within the CCP there are those, above all 
retired party veterans, who are pushing for liberal-democratic reforms; they are 
opposed by those who believe democracy will only lead to chaos. Some point out 
that there are various paths to democracy and that the West needed several hun-
dred	years	to	develop	its	current	political	system,	whereas	China	still	finds	itself	in	
a learning process. Particularly intensive discussions took place around the time of 
the	17th	Party	Congress	in	2007,	which	confirmed	the	leadership	of	Hu	Jintao	and	
Wen Jiabao. In 2005 the government published a White paper titled “The Building 
of Political Democracy in China.” This was followed in 2007 by another White paper 
titled “China’s Political Party System,” which proposed a harmonious, “consulta-
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tive” cooperation between several “democratic” parties under the leadership of the 
CCP as an alternative to Western-style party politics. In the same year, a group 
of prominent researchers from the Central Party School published “Storming the 
Fortress: A Research Report on Reform of China’s Political System” after the 17th 
Party Congress, which made recommendations for the comprehensive reform of the 
political system (Zhou et al. 2007).
However, the dynamic of this debate had already begun to subside after the 
CCP failed to make a decision on big political reforms at the 17th Party Congress. 
Instead, the CCP leadership concentrated on individual measures intended to im-
prove and secure its rule, especially at the local level. These measures focused on 
“intra-party democracy” and the introduction of competitive elections of party 
committees (more candidates than seats), more transparency and, in turn, greater 
control of local governments (“open government”), and direct elections of village 
committees. Under the label “consultative democracy” participatory elements were 
established as “input institutions,” such as advisory governmental institutions, pub-
lic hearings on legal texts, and the promotion of a more people-oriented “working 
style.” At this time, however, the leadership – Premier Wen Jiabao in particular – 
gave the impression that they still considered democracy to be a universal value, 
which in capitalist and socialist countries simply took different forms, and that “de-
mocracy with Chinese characteristics” would continue to develop.
one impulse for the debate on the degree and form of democratisation in China 
was the assessment of the fall of the Soviet Union. This had long been attributed to 
insufficient	flexibility	 towards	participatory	and	responsive	 forms	of	government.	
However, Xi Jinping drew a completely different conclusion: the failure of the Soviet 
Union was the result of a lack of stability within the Soviet party regime. Unlike 
under Hu and Wen, the “universality” of values was now considered a rallying cry 
of	the	West.	Instead	of	democratic	reforms,	the	fight	against	corruption	became	the	
centrepiece of policy reforms. Yet in China, no one seems to doubt the normative 
power of democracy. No party or government programme is agreed if it does not 
contain a section on democracy. In 2013 the leadership recommended for gene-
ral reading the bestseller The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State by Zhang 
Weiwei, a professor of international relations at Fudan University, which argues 
that multiparty democracy is unsuitable for China. Zhang also explains that the 
democracy-versus-autocracy	discourse	is	outdated.	He	argues	that	the	question	of	
“good governance” is more decisive, which is an area in which Western states can 
also still improve (Tatlow and Zhang 2015; Zhang 2015).
Han Zhen follows this logic, contending that China must no longer explain why 
it	is	not	yet	ripe	enough	for	democracy.	He	argues	that	it	can	confidently	stand	by	
its own form of democracy, thus appearing to suggest it can now do without the use 
of adjectives (like “consultative”). other intellectuals share Han’s opinion, claiming 
that they also see a “long-standing” and “true democracy” in China (Tian 2015). 
This view is likely to receive support amongst the Chinese population. In various 
analyses international researchers have shown that a substantial proportion of Chi-
nese citizens are in favour of personal freedoms, which are generally seen as a result 
of democracy, but at the same time have shown little commitment to the realisation 
of political freedoms such as the right to protest or organise and have no interest in 
a multiparty political system in China. This is especially true for the middle class, 
on whose desire for political representation modernisation theorists base their op-
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timism that authoritarian states will sooner or later inevitably experience a trans-
formation (Chen and Lu 2011).
At the same time, not only is trust in the central government and the party 
leadership very high, but large sections of respondents also believe that China is 
 already a democratic country (Lu and Shi 2014; Shi 2008). This initially surprising 
result	can	be	explained	by	the	answers	given	to	questions	respondents	were	addi-
tionally asked about the meaning of democracy. For many Chinese respondents, 
their understanding of democracy is not so much based on Western standards of 
multiparty systems or free elections but rather on whether the government repre-
sents the interests of the people. Thus they are less concerned about the exercise 
of democracy and more concerned by the results of governance – that is, whether 
the government can ensure a stable environment for social, economic, and political 
development and growing prosperity for the population. This “populist” understan-
ding of “guardianship democracy” (“as long as the government is a good govern-
ment, it is democratic”) was once championed in the mid-1990s by  advocates of 
“Asian  values.” It corresponds with the convictions of those who promote a  “Chinese 
model,” according to which a meritocratic form of democracy is ideal for China 
(Lu and Shi 2014; Pan 2010). These messages, which clearly support party rule in 
 China, are promoted by the education system and through “positive propaganda” in 
the media. At the same time, reference is repeatedly made to the “chaotic” results of 
Western democracy, whether in Hong Kong or in US election campaigns.
Warning to the Critics of Chinese “Democracy”
The	confident	 reorientation	of	 the	democracy	discourse	 in	China	has	yet	another	
component: China is already a “true” and effective democracy. This belief, expressed 
by Han, means that those who doubt China’s democratic character are seen to be 
aligning themselves with the “enemies of the Chinese people.” It is not a new notion 
that both inside and outside of China enemy forces (such as separatists, terrorists, 
and cyber criminals) are intent on ending CCP rule. What is new is the assertion 
that these “enemy forces” are behind virtually all of China’s problems, whether it be 
the slump in the stock markets, growing labour protests, social scientists highligh-
ting Mao’s mistakes, or corruption in the armed forces (economy 2015). The claim 
by the Chinese education minister, Yuan Guiren, that young teachers and students 
are	the	primary	targets	of	foreign	infiltration	attempts	caused	a	big	stir	at	the	be-
ginning of 2016. According to Yuan, it is for that reason that Western concepts such 
as the rule of law, civil society, and human rights should be banned from textbooks.
By portraying each doubter of the Chinese concept of democracy as a potential 
enemy,	the	quest	for	international	prerogative	of	interpretation	within	democracy	
discourse remains in line with domestic political goals. The assertion of discourse 
power	with	regard	to	the	democracy	question	should,	on	the	one	hand,	strengthen	
the supporters of the “Chinese model” and, on the other hand, serve as an implicit 
warning to the supporters of liberal democracy in China to no longer oppose of-
ficial	prerogative	of	 interpretation	of	 the	“Sino-socialist”	 set	of	values	–	 to	which	
democracy and rule of law in fact do belong. The 2015 amendment of the National 
Security Law supports this warning as does the Law on Foreign Non-governmental 
organisations, which was passed in April 2016. The latter places each Chinese in-
   8    GIGA FoCUS | ASIA | No. 2 | JUNe 2016 
stitution that receives funding from foreign donors, even from foundations or uni-
versities, under general suspicion of being a security threat. 
From Rule-Taker to Rule-Maker
It is likely that many in the West will dismiss China’s attempt to become the “world’s 
largest democracy” as nonsensical and implausible. China’s attempt to reframe its 
own political system – which all global indices of democracy measurement con-
sistently	rank	as	unequivocally	authoritarian	–	as	a	democracy	may	seem	an	absurd	
effort at self-legitimation by a democratically illegitimate party regime. Neverthel-
ess, the message underlying this endeavour should be taken seriously for several 
reasons.
First, it is always important to take into account the self-views and worldviews of 
actors in different regions, which are becoming increasingly important in a context 
of changing international power constellations. Along with India, Russia,  Brazil, 
and other emerging economies, China is amongst the most important rising powers. 
It is evident from an ethical as well as from a pragmatic perspective that a pluralistic 
approach to globalised research has to deal with the self-perceptions, discourses, 
and	values	of	these	increasingly	important	global	players	in	their		specific	historical	
and	 cultural	 contexts	 (Narlikar	 2016).	 It	 is	 not	 a	 question	 of	 exaggerating	 these	
discourses	and	values	 in	essentialist	 terms	or	even	euphemising	official	attempts	
of political self-legitimation; rather, it is about using context-sensitive understan-
dings of the self-perceptions and worldviews of major global players to better assess 
additional political, social, and economic development prospects, as well as behavi-
oural options and negotiation options, at the international level.
Second, China’s positioning as the “world’s largest democracy” represents an 
almost ironic response to the continued widespread expectation amongst Western 
actors that the party regime will sooner or later undergo democratisation in the 
wake of economic modernisation. As analyses of internal political debates in China 
show, a veritable sterilisation of the demands for Western-style liberal-democratic 
reforms goes hand in hand with the party-state’s monopolisation of interpretati-
on	of	“democracy.”	At	the	same	time,	the	confidence	of	the	party	leadership	in	its	
own concept of democracy is based on the widespread belief amongst the Chinese 
population	that	democracy	 is	realised	when	a	“good	government”	adequately	and	
effectively represents the people’s interests.
Third, at the international level the Chinese leadership now appears to place 
considerable importance on vociferously protesting against the long-standing and 
painful “discourse hegemony” of the West. Thus, one should expect that China will 
continue	to	increasingly	demand	an	equal	position	in	the	global	competition	over	
values	and	discourses.	In	fact,	since	Xi	Jinping	took	office,	there	have	been	a	grow-
ing number of signals that China is preparing itself, at least regionally, to go from 
being a rule-taker to being a rule-maker – whether this is through the New Silk 
Road initiative, the establishment of the New Development Bank, or the Asian In-
frastructure Investment Bank – all of which have put the established international 
organisations in their place.
Finally, the alternative governance discourses and values clearly represent an 
increasingly hard currency in times of emerging geopolitical alliances. China’s re-
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jection of the perceived “discourse hegemony” could represent an attractive model 
for	actors	in	other	regions,	who	could	have	sufficient	reason	to	accept	China	as	an	
alternative international rule-maker and, possibly, also as a “democratic” leader.
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